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Abstract—This paper considers a three-receiver broadcast
channel with degraded message sets and message cognition. The
model consists of a common message for all three receivers,
a private common message for only two receivers and two
additional private messages for these two receivers, such that
each receiver is only interested in one message, while being
fully cognizant of the other one. First, this model is investigated
without any secrecy constraints, where the capacity region is
established, showing that the straightforward extension of the
Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound to the investigated scenario is
optimal. In particular, this agrees with Nair and Wang’s result,
which states that the idea of indirect decoding – introduced to
improve the Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound – does not provide a
better region for this scenario. Further, some secrecy constraints
are introduced by letting the private messages to be confidential
ones. Two different secrecy criteria are considered: joint secrecy
and individual secrecy. For both criteria, a general achievable
rate region is provided. Moreover, the joint and individual secrecy
capacity regions are established, if the two legitimate receivers
are more capable than the eavesdropper. The established capacity
regions indicate that the individual secrecy criterion can provide
a larger capacity region as compared to the joint one, because
each cognizant message can be used as a secret key for the
other individual message. Further, the joint secrecy capacity is
established for a more general class of more capable channels,
where only one of the two legitimate receivers is more capable
than the eavesdropper. This was done by showing that principle
of indirect decoding introduced by Nair and El Gamal is optimal
for this class of channels. This result is in contrast with the non-
secrecy case, where the indirect decoding does not provide any
gain.
Index Terms—broadcast channel, degraded message sets, mes-
sage cognition, joint secrecy, individual secrecy, capacity regions,
more capable channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast channel (BC) with degraded message sets
was initially introduced by Ko¨rner and Marton in [3]. They
considered a two-receiver BC, where a common message
is transmitted to both receivers and a private message is
transmitted to only one of them. They established the capacity
region for the general BC by providing a strong converse. The
extension of Ko¨rner and Marton results to the three-receiver
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BC with two degraded message sets has been considered
in [4, 5], where it has been shown that the straightforward
extension of the Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound is optimal
for many special cases. In [6], Nair and El Gamal considered
a three-receiver BC with degraded message sets, where a
common message is sent to all three receivers, while a private
message is sent to only one receiver. They showed that the
straightforward extension of the Ko¨rner and Marton inner
bound for this scenario is no longer optimal. They presented
a new coding scheme known as indirect decoding and showed
that the resultant inner bound of this technique is strictly
greater than the Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound. However,
in [7], Nair and Wang showed that if the private message
is to be sent to two receivers instead of one, the idea of
indirect decoding does not yield any region better than the
Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound. Another scenario for three-
receiver BC with degraded message sets was considered in
[8], where a common message is sent to all three receivers,
while two private messages are only sent to two receivers
with some message cognition at these receivers. In general, the
transmission of degraded message sets over three-receiver BC
has captured a lot of attention, yet it has not been completely
solved as many questions remained unanswered beyond the
two-receiver case.
Recent work does not only consider reliable transmission,
but it also considers more complex scenarios that involve
certain secrecy requirements. In particular, physical layer
security has attracted a lot of researchers nowadays, see for
example [9–12] and references therein. Shannon was the first
one to study the problem of secure communication from an
information theoretic perspective in [13]. He showed that it can
be achieved by a secret key shared between the transmitter
and the receiver if the entropy of this key is greater than
or equal to the entropy of the message to be transmitted.
In [14], Wyner studied the degraded wiretap channel and
proved that secure transmission is still achievable over a noisy
channel without any secret key. In [15], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
extended Wyner’s result to the general BC with common and
confidential messages. In [16, 17], the previous two approaches
were combined by studying the availability of a shared secret
key during secure transmission over a wiretap channel. In
[18], Kang and Liu proved that the secrecy capacity for this
scenario is achieved by combining the wiretap coding principle
along with Shannon’s one-time pad idea. Over the years, the
integration of confidential and public services over different
channels has become very important [19].
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Despite the tremendous effort of researchers, the extension
of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s work to BC with two or more
legitimate receivers has remained an open topic. In [20], Chia
and El Gamal investigated the transmission of one common
and one confidential message over a BC with two legitimate
receivers and one eavesdropper. They derived a general achiev-
able rate region and established the secrecy capacity if the
two legitimate receivers are less noisy than the eavesdropper.
They also showed that in some cases the indirect decoding can
provide an inner bound that is strictly larger than the direct
extension of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s approach.
In this paper we investigate the transmission of degraded
message sets with two layers over a three-receiver BC under
different secrecy constraints. Our model combines the scenar-
ios in [7, 8, 20] as follows: a common message is transmitted to
all three receivers, a confidential common message to the two
legitimate receivers and two confidential individual messages
to the two legitimate receivers, where each receiver is only
interested in one them, while being fully cognizant of the other
one. This problem is of high interest and importance because
it does not only generalize and combine the previous works
in [7, 8, 20], but it is also of practical relevance since it can be
motivated by the concept of two-phase bidirectional relaying
in a three-node network [21, 22].
In the first phase of the bidirectional relaying, node 1
and node 2 transmit their messages to the relay node which
decodes them, while keeping the eavesdropper unable to
intercept any information about the transmission. This phase
corresponds to the multiple access wiretap channel and was
investigated in [23–25], where the latter discusses different se-
crecy criteria. Our work is related to the succeeding broadcast
phase, where the relay re-encodes and transmits these mes-
sages back to the intended nodes. Since the receiving nodes
are cognizant of their own message from the previous phase,
they can use it as an additional side information for decoding.
First results for the case where this communication scenario
must be protected against an additional eavesdropper appeared
in [26], where different achievable rate regions and an outer
bound were provided. In our problem, we have an additional
feature as the relay transmits another common confidential
message to both legitimate receivers and a common message
for all three nodes.
In [26], the authors claimed to define the secrecy re-
quirement of their model based on a conservative secrecy
measure known as joint secrecy. This measure assures the
secrecy of each confidential message even if the other one is
compromised. However, they established an achievable region
in [26, Theorem 1] using secret key approach, where the
confidential message of one user is used as a secret key
for the other one. One can show that this encoding scheme
does not fulfill the joint secrecy constraint. This observation
encouraged us to consider another secrecy constraint, in which
the legitimate receivers can cooperate together to protect their
confidential messages based on some form of mutual trust.
This led to the less conservative secrecy measure known as
individual secrecy. In [1, 2], we investigated the effect of
relaxing the secrecy constraint from joint secrecy to individual
secrecy on the capacity region of the BC with receiver side
information. On the other hand, different individual secrecy
coding techniques has been introduced in an early parallel and
independent work in [27] and more recently in [28–30].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the model of three-receiver BC with degraded
message sets and full message cognition without any secrecy
constraints. We provide a weak converse showing that the
straightforward extension of the Ko¨rner and Marton inner-
bound is in fact the capacity region. This result agrees with
the one in [7], that for this case indirect decoding can not
outperform the Ko¨rner and Marton inner bound. In Section III,
we introduce secrecy constraints to our model and discuss the
differences between the joint and individual secrecy criteria. In
Section IV, we provide an achievable rate region for the joint
secrecy criterion. We then establish the joint secrecy capacity
region if only one of the legitimate receivers is more capable
than the eavesdropper using the principle of indirect decoding.
In Section V, we provide an achievable rate region for the
individual secrecy criterion. We then establish the individual
secrecy capacity region if the two legitimate receivers are more
capable than the eavesdropper.
Notation
In this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters
and their realizations by the corresponding lower case letters,
while calligraphic letters are used to denote sets. Xn denotes
the sequence of variables (X1, . . . ,Xn), where Xi is the ith
variable in the sequence. Additionally, we use X˜i to denote
the sequence (Xi, . . . ,Xn). A probability distribution for the
random variable X is denoted by Q(x). U−V −X denotes
a Markov chain of random variable U, V and X in this order,
while (U−V,K)−X−Y implies that U−V −X−Y and
K−X−Y are Markov chains. R+ is used to denote the set
of nonnegative real numbers. H(·) and I(·; ·) are the traditional
entropy and mutual information. The probability of an event is
given by P[·], while E[·] is used to represent the expectation.
Moreover, Ja, bK is used to represent the set of natural numbers
between a and b.
II. BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS AND MESSAGE
COGNITION
In this section, we investigate the three-receiver BC with
degraded message sets and message cognition without any se-
crecy constraints. First, we introduce our model, then establish
the capacity region for the general three-receiver BC with two
degraded message sets.
A. System Model and Channel Comparison
Let X , Y1, Y2 and Z be finite input and output sets. Then
for input and output sequences xn ∈ Xn, yn1 ∈ Yn1 , yn2 ∈ Yn2
and zn ∈ Zn of length n, the discrete memoryless BC is given
by
Qn(yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
k=1
Q(y1k, y2k, zk|xk),
where xn represents the transmitted sequence, yn1 , y
n
2 and z
n
represent the received sequence at the three receivers. Before
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we discuss our model in details, we need to introduce two
important classes of BCs, that we will address a lot in our
investigation.
Definition 1. In a discrete memoryless BC Q(y, z|x), Y is
said to be less noisy than Z, also written as Y  Z, if for
every random variable V such that V −X− (Y,Z) forms a
Markov chain, we have
I(V; Y) ≥ I(V; Z). (1)
On the other hand, Y is said to be more capable than Z, if
for every input distribution on X, we have
I(X; Y) ≥ I(X; Z). (2)
The class of more capable channels is strictly wider than
the less noisy one. It can be shown that any less noisy channel
is a more capable one. Further, it was shown that the class of
less noisy channels contains the physically and stochastically
degraded channels [31].
We consider the standard model with a block code of arbi-
trary but fixed length n. We consider four different messages
sets. The first set contains the common messages for all three
receivers and is denoted byMc = J1, 2nRcK. The second set is
denoted byM0 = J1, 2nR0K and contains the private common
messages for Receivers 1 and 2. While the last two sets
contain the individual private messages M1 = J1, 2nR1K and
M2 = J1, 2nR2K. Further, we assume full message cognition
at Y1 and Y21, such that Y1 is cognizant of the entire message
M2 and Y2 of the entire message M1 as shown in Fig. 1.
ChannelEncoder
M0
Mc
M1
M2
M1 Receiver 2
M2 Receiver 1
Receiver 3
Xn
Yn1
Yn2
Zn
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1)
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ2)
Mˆc
Fig. 1. Three-receiver broadcast channel with degraded message sets and
message cognition.
Remark 1. If we let M1 = M2 = ∅, our model reduces to
the three-receiver BC with two degraded message sets studied
in [6, 7].
Definition 2. A (2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code Cn for the
BC with degraded message sets and message cognition con-
sists of: four independent message sets Mc, M0, M1 and
M2; an encoding function at the transmitter
E :Mc ×M0 ×M1 ×M2 → Xn
which maps a message quadruple (mc,m0,m1,m2) ∈Mc×
M0 ×M1 ×M2 to a codeword xn(mc,m0,m1,m2); and
three decoders, one at each receiver
ϕ1 : Yn1 ×M2 →Mc ×M0 ×M1 ∪ {?}
ϕ2 : Yn2 ×M1 →Mc ×M0 ×M2 ∪ {?}
ϕ3 : Zn →Mc ∪ {?}
1From this point, we will refer to different receivers by their respective
channel outputs interchangeably.
that maps each channel observation at the respective receiver
and the cognizant message to the corresponding intended
messages or an error message {?}.
We assume that the messages Mc, M0, M1 and M2 are
independent and chosen uniformly at random. The reliability
performance of Cn is measured in terms of its average prob-
ability of error
Pe(Cn) , P
[
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1) 6= (Mc,M0,M1) or
(M˜c, M˜0, M˜2) 6= (Mc,M0,M2) or Mˇc 6= Mc
]
, (3)
where (Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1), (M˜c, M˜0, M˜2) and Mˇc are the estimated
messages at Y1, Y2 and Z respectively.
Definition 3. A rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+
is achievable for the BC with degraded message sets
and message cognition, if there exists a sequence of
(2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes Cn and a sequence n, such
that for n is large enough, the following holds
Pe(Cn) ≤ n and lim
n→∞ n = 0. (4)
B. Capacity Region
Theorem 1. The capacity region of the three-receiver BC with
degraded message sets and message cognition is the set of all
rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2) (5)
for some (U,X), such that U−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a
Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 2.
Proof: The achievability follows directly from the
straightforward extension of the Ko¨rner and Marton inner
bound in [3] to the three-receiver BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition as in [7, 8]. Superposition encoding
is used as follows: mc is encoded in the cloud centers
codewords Un, while (m0,m1,m2) are superimposed in the
satellite codewords Xn. Joint typicality decoders are then used
at each receiver leading to the bounds in (5).
For the converse, we start by establishing the reliability
upper bounds for any achievable rates. Based on Fano’s
inequality, the expression of the average error probability in
(3) and the reliability constraint given by (4), we have
H(Mc|Zn),H(Mc|Yn1M2),H(Mc|Yn2M1) ≤ nγc(n) (6)
H(M0M1|Yn1M2Mc) ≤ nγ1(n) (7)
H(M0M2|Yn2M1Mc) ≤ nγ2(n) (8)
where γc(n) = 1/n + nRc, γ1(n) = 1/n + n(R0 + R1)
and γ2(n) = 1/n+ n(R0 +R2).
Next, we let Ui , (Mc, Z˜i+1), K1i , Yi−11 , K2i , Yi−12 ,
M , (M0,M1,M2), Vi , (M,Ui), V1i , (Vi,K1i ) and V2i ,
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(Vi,K
2
i ). We then start by considering the common rate Rc.
Using Eq. (6), we have
Rc ≤ 1
n
[
H(Mc)−H(Mc|Zn)
]
+ γc(n)
=
1
n
I(Mc; Zn) + γc(n)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Mc; Zi|Z˜i+1) + γc(n)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(McZ˜i+1; Zi) + γc(n)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Zi) + γc(n). (9)
Next, we consider the sum of the private rates (R0 + R1)
which are intended for receiver Y1. We have
R0 +R1
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(M0M1; Yn1 |M2Mc) + γ1(n)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc) + I(M; Zn|Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ γ1(n)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 ) + I(M; Zi|McZ˜i+1)
− I(M; Zi|McZ˜i+1)
]
+ γ1(n)
(c)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1) + I(M; Zi|McZ˜i+1)
− I(M; Zi|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)
]
+ γ1(n)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
+ I(Vi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ γ1(n), (10)
where (a) follows from (7); (b) follows as I(M; Yn1 |Mc) ≥
I(M0M1; Yn1 |M2Mc) and (c) follows by the Csisza´r sum
identity [15, Lemma 7]. If we use Eq. (8) and follow the exact
same steps, we can derive a similar bound for the sum of the
private rates (R0 +R2) intended for receiver Y2 as follows:
R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|UiK2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
+ I(Vi; Zi|Ui)
]
+ γ2(n). (11)
Now using (9), (10) and (11) followed by introduc-
ing a time sharing random variable T independent of
all others and uniformly distributed over J1;nK, and let
U = (UT,T), K1 = K1T, K
2 = K2T, V = VT, V
1 = V1T,
V2 = V2T, Y1 = Y1T, Y2 = Y2T and Z = ZT, then take the
limit as n → ∞ such that, γc(n), γ1(n) and γ2(n) → 0,
we reach the following
Rc ≤ I(U; Z) (12a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|UK1)− I(V1; Z|UK1) + I(V; Z|U)
(12b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|UK2)− I(V2; Z|UK2) + I(V; Z|U),
(12c)
where (U−V,K1)−V1−X−(Y1,Y2,Z) and (U−V,K2)−V2
−X−(Y1,Y2,Z) form Markov chains. Since the conditional
mutual information is the expectation of the unconditional one,
Eq. (12b) can be further upper-bounded as follows:
R0+R1 ≤ EK1
[
I(V1; Y1|UK1)−I(V1; Z|UK1)
]
+ I(V; Z|U)
(a)
≤ I(V1; Y1|U,K1 = k1∗)−I(V1; Z|U,K1 = k1∗)
+ I(V; Z|U)
(b)
= I(V1∗; Y1|U)− I(V1∗; Z|U) + I(V; Z|U) (13)
where (a) follows as k1∗ is the value of K1 that maximizes
the difference I(V1; Y1|U,K1 = k1)−I(V1; Z|U,K1 = k1);
while (b) follows because V1∗ is distributed according to
the following probability distribution Q(v1|u, k1 = k1∗) [11,
Corollary 2.3]. This implies that the right hand side of Eq.
(12b) is maximized by setting K1 = k1∗. Using this result,
we can upper-bound Eq. (12b) as follows:
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|UK1)− I(V1; Z|UK1) + I(V; Z|U)
(a)
= I(V1; Y1|UK1) + I(K1; Z|U)− I(K1; Z|V)
(b)
≤ I(V1; Y1|U,K1 = k1∗) + I(K1 = k1∗; Z|U)
− I(K1 = k1∗; Z|V)
(c)
= I(V1∗; Y1|U)
(d)
≤ I(X; Y1|U), (14)
where (a) follows by the mutual information chain rule;
(b) follows because setting K1 = k1∗ maximizes the right
hand side of Eq. (12b); (c) follows because I(k1∗; Z|U) and
I(k1∗; Z|V) vanish for a fixed realization of K1 = k1∗; while
(d) follows from the data processing inequality and the fact
that U−V1∗ −X−(Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain, which
implies that I(V1∗; Y1|U) ≤ I(X; Y1|U).
Now, If we apply the same steps and ideas to Eq. (12c), we
can derive the following bound:
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2∗; Y2|U)
≤ I(X; Y2|U), (15)
where U−V2∗ −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain and
V2∗ is distributed as Q(v2|u, k2 = k2∗) such that, k2∗ is the
value of K2 that maximizes the difference I(V2; Y2|U,K2 =
k2)− I(V2; Z|U,K2 = k2). At this point we need to illustrate
an important fact. One might argue that getting rid of the
two conditional random variables K1 and K2 as we did, can
not be done simultaneously because K1 and K2 might be
dependent, such that the maximizing values k1∗ and k2∗ can
not occur concurrently. However, this argument does not affect
our converse because it only implies that the derived upper
bounds might not be as tight as the original ones. To finalize
our converse, we need to highlight the standard upper bounds
BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS AND MESSAGE COGNITION 5
for reliable transmission
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2). (16)
Now, if we combine (12a), along with (14), (15) and (16),
such that U−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain, we
reach the same region given by (5). In order to complete our
converse, we need to point out that the cardinality argument
|U| ≤ |X |+2 follows from the Fenchel-Bunt strengthening of
the usual Carathe´odory’s theorem [31, Appendix C].
Remark 2. It is important to note that, Theorem 1 implies
that the inner bound established in [7] is in fact the capacity
region.
III. SECRECY IN BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS
AND MESSAGE COGNITION
In this section, we will investigate the three-receiver BC
with degraded message sets and message cognition under
two different secrecy constraints: joint secrecy and individual
secrecy. We compare these two criteria by investigating their
capacity regions for some special cases and show that the
individual secrecy provides a larger secrecy capacity compared
to the joint one.
A. Secrecy Model and Criteria
We start by modifying the model introduced in the previous
section, such that the private messages M0,M1 and M2 are
now confidential messages that need to be kept secret from the
eavesdropper as shown in Figure 2. Our new code is defined
as follows:
ChannelEncoder
M0
Mc
M1
M2
M1 Receiver 2
M2 Receiver 1
Eavesdropper
Xn
Yn1
Yn2
Zn
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1)
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ2)
Mˆc
(M0,M1,M2) Secret
Fig. 2. Wiretap broadcast channel with degraded message sets and message
cognition
Definition 4. A (2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code Csn for the
wiretap BC with degraded message sets and message cognition
consists of: four independent message setsMc,M0,M1 and
M2; a source of local randomness at the encoder R which
is distributed according to Q(r); an encoding function at the
relay node
E :Mc ×M0 ×M1 ×M2 ×R → Xn
which maps a common message mc ∈ Mc, a confidential
message triple (m0,m1,m2) ∈ M0 × M1 × M2 and a
realization of the local randomness r ∈ R to a codeword
xn(mc,m0,m1,m2, r), and three decoders, one for each node
ϕ1 : Yn1 ×M2 →Mc ×M0 ×M1 ∪ {?}
ϕ2 : Yn2 ×M1 →Mc ×M0 ×M2 ∪ {?}
ϕ3 : Zn →Mc ∪ {?}
that maps each channel observation at the respective node and
the cognizant message to the corresponding required messages
or an error message {?}.
We assume that the messages Mc, M0, M1 and M2 are
chosen uniformly at random and use the average error prob-
ability in (3) to measure the reliability performance of the
code Csn. On the other hand, the secrecy performance of Csn
is measured with respect to two different criteria. These two
criteria identify the level of ignorance of the eavesdropper2
about the confidential messages M0, M1 and M2 as follows:
1. Joint Secrecy: This criterion requires the leakage of the
confidential messages of one user to the eavesdropper given
the individual message of the other user to be small. For our
model, this requirement can be expressed as follows:
I(M0M1; Zn|M2) ≤ τ1n and I(M0M2; Zn|M1) ≤ τ2n,
where lim
n→∞ τ1n, τ2n = 0. (17)
This criterion guarantees that the rate of information leaked
to the eavesdropper from one user is small even if the other
individual transmitted message is compromised. Thus, in this
scenario the legitimate receivers do not have to trust each other.
In some literature, the joint secrecy criterion is defined such
that, the mutual leakage of all confidential messages to the
eavesdropper is small as follows:
I(M0M1M2; Zn) ≤ τn and lim
n→∞ τn = 0. (18)
One can easily show that the definition in (17) is equivalent
to the one in (18) for some τn as follows:
I(M0M1M2; Zn) = I(M0M1; Zn|M2) + I(M2; Zn)
(a)
≤ I(M0M1; Zn|M2) + I(M2; Zn|M1)
(b)
≤ I(M0M1; Zn|M2) + I(M0M2; Zn|M1)
≤ τ1n + τ2n ≤ τn,
where (a) follows because M1 and M2 are independent which
implies that I(M2; Zn) ≤ I(M2; Zn|M1); while (b) follows be-
cause I(M2; Zn|M1) ≤ I(M0M2; Zn|M1). On the other hand,
if Eq. (18) holds, it follows directly that I(M0M1; Zn|M2) ≤
τn and I(M0M2; Zn|M1) ≤ τn. However, we prefer the
definition in (17), because it provides a better understanding
to the relation between the legitimate receivers and allows
us to interpret the immunity of the joint secrecy against
compromised receivers.
2. Individual Secrecy: This criterion requires the leakage
of the confidential messages of each user to the eavesdropper
to be small without conditioning on the confidential messages
of the others users. This requirement can be formulated as
follows:
I(M0M1; Zn) ≤ τ1n and I(M0M2; Zn) ≤ τ2n, (19)
where τ1n and τ2n are defined as before. Differently from the
conservative constraint in (17), where different users do not
2Although the third receiver (Z) is part of our model and not an external
user, we will refer to it in the rest of the paper as an eavesdropper.
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trust each other, this secrecy measure allows the legitimate
receivers to cooperate in protecting their messages against
eavesdropping. In some literatures the individual secrecy cri-
terion requires the sum of the leakages of each confidential
message to the eavesdropper to be small as:
I(M0; Zn) + I(M1; Zn) + I(M2; Zn) ≤ τn. (20)
However, this definition is only equivalent to the one in (19)
if M0 = ∅, but in general they are not the same. In fact, the
constraint in (19) is stronger than this one. This is because
Eq. (19) directly implies Eq. (20), while the opposite is not
correct. The difference between these two definitions is in the
interpretation of the word individual. In (19), individuality
means different transmission flows, while in (20) it means
different confidential messages. In this paper, we will use the
individual secrecy constraint given in (19) because it implies
the other constraint in (20) and we think it is more convenient
and meaningful.
Definition 5. A rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+
is achievable for the wiretap BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition, if there exist a sequence of
(2nRc , 2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes Csn and three sequences
n, τ1n, τ2n, where n is large enough, such that
Pe(Cn) ≤ n, lim
n→∞ n, τ1n, τ2n = 0. (21)
and depending on the selected secrecy criterion, the conditions
in (17) or (19) are fulfilled.
Remark 3. It is worth mentioning that the previous definition
and the requirements of the joint and individual secrecy
criteria use the notation of strong secrecy [32, 33], where the
intuition is to have the total amount of information leaked to
the eavesdropper to be small.
Remark 4. It is important to note how our model generalize
different works on the wiretap BC with more than one legiti-
mate receiver as follows:
• If we let M1 = M2 = ∅, our model reduces to the
three receivers BC with common and confidential messages
investigated in [20].
• If we let Mc = M0 = ∅, our model reduces to the
wiretap BC with receiver side information. This channel was
investigated under the joint secrecy constraint in [1, 26] and
under the individual secrecy constraint in [1, 27].
B. Individual Secrecy in Shannon’s Ciphering System
In this subsection, we will use Shannon’s ciphering system
to show why addressing individual secrecy with respect to
different messages might be misleading, and that it is more
consistent to interpret individuality with respect to different
transmission flows. We consider the scenario given by Fig-
ure 3. Shannon studied this model under the following secrecy
constraint:
I(M; X) = 0. (22)
He proved that this requirement is achieved if H(M)≤H(K),
where K is the secret key shared between the transmit-
ter and the receiver. In practical, it is hard to fulfill this
Encoder
K
Decoder
Eavesdropper
M
M1,M2
X Mˆ
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
M Secret
M1,M2 Secret
Fig. 3. Shannon’s Cipher System
condition because secret keys are usually shorter than the
message. Now assume that we have a secret key such that
H(K) = 12H(M). We can construct the following coding strat-
egy. First, we divide M into two messages M1 and M2,
such that H(M1) = H(M2) = H(K). We then construct a new
secret key K˜ by concatenating K and M1. Now the encoder
outputs X = M⊗ K˜, which is equivalent to the concatenation
of M1 ⊗K and M2 ⊗M1. The decoder works in the following
order, it first extracts Mˆ1 from the first part of X by Xoring
it with the shared secret key K, then it use Mˆ1 to extract Mˆ2
from the second part of X.
Using this technique, we can overcome the problem of short
secret key, however we need to understand the drawbacks of
such technique. Aside form the problem of error progression
that arises form using the estimated Mˆ1 to decode M2,
this technique does not fulfill the secrecy constraint in (22).
However, it fulfill the following individual secrecy constraint:
I(M1; X) + I(M2; X) = 0. (23)
In general, we can extend this coding technique for short
keys with smaller entropy by dividing the message M into
smaller messages of the same entropy as the given key as
M =
∏L
i=1 Mi. We can show that, the previous technique
grants a certain secrecy level such that, the sum of the leakage
of the small messages to the eavesdropper is small.
The difference between the two secrecy measures in the
previous example is related to how to address the secrecy of
information transmitted to a single user; whether it should be
protected as a one big entity or it can be divided into smaller
parts, where each part is protected separately. This issue is
identical to the problem of identifying the individual secrecy
and whether individuality means different users or different
messages. That is why, we preferred the individual secrecy
constraint in (19) because it requires the whole information
transmitted to a certain user to be protected as one big entity. In
our opinion, this is a more consistent and meaningful notation.
C. Secrecy Capacity Regions: Joint Vs Individual
In this subsection, we will try to highlight the differences
between the joint and the individual secrecy criteria. To do so,
we will compare the secrecy capacity region of both criteria
for some special cases. Before we discuss these results, we
need to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let Q(y, z|x) be a discrete memoryless BC and
assume that Y is less noisy than Z. Consider two independent
random variables M and W, such that (M,W) − Xn −
(Yn,Zn) forms a Markov chain. Then the following holds:
I(M; Yn|W) ≥ I(M; Zn|W).
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Proof: The proof uses a combination of standard tech-
niques from [11, 15] and is given in Appendix A for com-
pleteness.
In the first scenario, we consider a class of less noisy
wiretap BC as in Figure 2, where the eavesdropper is less
noisy than the two legitimate receivers. We also modify the
model such that, we only have the two individual confidential
messages M1 and M2, without the common message Mc
and the common confidential message M0. Thus, the joint
secrecy conditions in (17) change to I(M1; Zn|M2) ≤ τ1n and
I(M2; Zn|M1) ≤ τ2n, while the individual secrecy conditions
in (19) change to I(M1; Zn) ≤ τ1n and I(M2; Zn) ≤ τ2n.
Theorem 2. Consider a wiretap BC with message cognition,
where the eavesdropper Z is less noisy than the two legitimate
receivers Y1 and Y2, i.e. Z  Y1 and Z  Y2. Then the joint
secrecy capacity region is empty, while the individual secrecy
capacity region is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈
R2+ that satisfy
R1 = R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1), I(X; Y2)
]
. (24)
Proof: We start with the individual secrecy capacity
region. The proof of the achievability is based on interpreting
each individual message as a secret key for the other one.
The encoder constructs the Xored message M⊗ by Xoring the
corresponding elements of M1 and M2 as follows:
m⊗ = m1 ⊗m2.
In order to transmit a message pair (m1,m2), the encoder
generates the sequence Xn(m⊗), then transmits it to both
receivers. The problem simplifies to a multicast problem and
reliable transmission is only guaranteed by the condition in
(24). Each legitimate receiver decodes the Xored message M⊗
then uses the side information to extract it is own message.
On the other hand, the eavesdropper can not extract any
information about M1 and M2, although it can correctly
decode M⊗, because I(M⊗,M1) = 0 and I(M⊗,M2) = 0.
Now for the converse, using Lemma 1, we will show that, if
Z is less noisy than both Y1 and Y2, the two rates R1 and R2
are equal. Let n and τn = max(τ1n, τ2n) be two sequences,
such that as n→∞, n and τn → 0, we have
R1
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(M1; Yn1 |M2) + γ1(n)
≤ 1
n
I(M1M2; Yn1 ) + γ1(n)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(M1M2; Yn1 )− I(M1; Zn)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
=
1
n
[
I(M1M2; Yn1 )− I(M1M2; Zn) + I(M2; Zn|M1)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
I(M2; Zn|M1) + γ1(n, τn)
(d)
≤ R2 + γ1(n, τn), (25)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality as γ1(n) = 1/n+
nR1; (b) follows from (19), when M0 = ∅ and γ1(n, τn) =
(1 + τn)/n+ nR1; (c) follows from Lemma 1 because Z 
Y1, which implies that I(M1M2; Yn1 ) − I(M1M2; Zn) ≤ 0
and (d) follows because R2 ≥ 1/nI(M2; Zn|M1). If we let
γ2(n, τ2n) = (1 + τ2n)/n+ nR2 and follow the same steps
we can derive a similar bound for R2 as follows:
R2 ≤ R1 + γ2(n, τ2n). (26)
Now in order to finalize our converse we need to highlight
the standard upper bound for reliable transmission for each
receiver given by:
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1) and R2 ≤ I(X; Y2). (27)
Finally, if we take the limit as n→∞ for (25), (26), such that
γ1(n, τn) and γ2(n, τn)→ 0, Our converse for the individual
secrecy capacity region in (24) is complete.
Now, we turn to the other half of the theorem that indicates
that the joint secrecy capacity region is empty if the eaves-
dropper is less noisy than the two legitimate receivers. The
proof is based on Lemma 1 and is a direct consequence of
[10, Proposition 3.4] and [15] as follows:
R1
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(M1; Yn1 |M2) + γ1(n)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(M1; Yn1 |M2)− I(M1; Zn|M2)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
(c)
≤ γ1(n, τn). (28)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality; (b) follows from
(17), for M0 = ∅; while (c) follows from Lemma 1 because
Z  Y1, which implies that I(M1; Yn1 |M2) ≤ I(M1; Zn|M2).
Similarly, we have for R2 the following
R2 ≤ γ2(n, τn). (29)
Now if we take the limit as n → ∞ for (28), (29), such that
γ1(n, τn) and γ2(n, τn) → 0, we have R1 = R2 = 0. This
implies that the joint secrecy capacity region for this scenario
is empty.
Remark 5. The previous result was established for wiretap BC
with receiver side information, where the legitimate receivers
Y1 and Y2 are degraded from the eavesdropper Z in [28].
In the next scenario, we will continue with the previous
model, where we discuss the wiretap BC in Figure 2 with only
M1 and M2. However, we will investigate a different class of
less noisy channels, where the two legitimate receivers Y1 and
Y2 are less noisy than the eavesdropper Z.
Theorem 3. Consider a wiretap BC with message cognition,
where the two legitimate receivers Y1 and Y2 are less noisy
than the eavesdropper Z, i.e. Y1  Z and Y2  Z. Then the
joint secrecy capacity region is given by the set of all rate
pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+, such that
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z)
R2 ≤ I(X; Y2)− I(X; Z).
(30)
While, the individual secrecy capacity region for the same
scenario is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+
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that satisfy
R1 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z) +R2 , I(X; Y1)
]
R2 ≤ min
[
I(X; Y2)− I(X; Z) +R1 , I(X; Y2)
]
.
(31)
Remark 6. Since the class of less noisy channels includes
the class of physically and stochastically degraded channels,
the previous theorem generalizes the secrecy capacity regions
established in [28], for the wiretap BC with message cognition,
where the eavesdropper is degraded from both legitimate
receivers.
Proof: We will only give a sketch for the ideas of the
proof as we will present a detailed proof in the next sections
for a more general case. The achievability of the joint secrecy
region follows from technique of random coding with product
structure as in [15], while the achievability of the individual
secrecy region combines the techniques of wiretap random
coding along with Shannon’s one time pad cipher system used
in Theorem 2, where the ciphered message is used as a part
of the randomization index needed for the wiretap random
coding. This encoding scheme was first introduced in [27].
On the other hand, the converse for the joint secrecy region
follows using the standard techniques and procedures used
in [20] for less noisy channels. While the converse for the
individual secrecy region follows by adapting those techniques
to the individual secrecy constraint.
Differently from the previous two scenarios, where the joint
and the individual secrecy criteria lead to different capacity
regions, in the next example, we will investigate a scenario
where the two secrecy criteria are equivalent. Consider a
wiretap BC as in Figure 2, where we only have the common
message Mc and the common confidential message M0. One
can easily conclude by comparing the requirements of the
joint secrecy and the individual secrecy in (17) and (19) when
M1 = M2 = ∅, that the two secrecy criteria are the same.
Again, we will focus on a class of less noisy channels, where
one of the legitimate receivers is less noisy than the other one,
while the relation to the eavesdropper is arbitrary.
Theorem 4. The joint and individual secrecy capacity region
for the wiretap BC with a common message and one confiden-
tial message, if one of the legitimate receivers is less noisy than
the other one (Y1  Y2), is the set of all rates (Rc, R0) ∈ R2+
that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
R0 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U) (32)
for some (U,V,X), such that U−V −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3 and
|V| ≤ |X |2 + 4|X |+ 3.
Proof: The achievability follows from the straightforward
extension of the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner results in [15], leading to the
following lower bounds:
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
R0 ≤ I(V; Y1|U)− I(V; Z|U)
R0 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U). (33)
Since Y1  Y2, which implies that I(U; Y2) ≤ I(U; Y1) and
I(V; Y2|U) ≤ I(V; Y1|U). Substituting these two relations in
(33) leads the achievability of the region in (32). On the
other hand, the converse follows directly using the standard
techniques in [15, Theorem 1].
D. Discussion
The previous examples are very helpful in understanding the
differences between the joint and individual secrecy criteria.
They also helps in capturing the advantages and disadvantages
of each one. This can be summarized in the following points:
1. Any code that satisfies the joint secrecy criterion will also
satisfy the individual one as well. This advocates the fact that
the individual secrecy is a less conservative secrecy measure
as compared to the joint one.
2. The individual secrecy criterion provides a larger capacity
region as compared to the joint one. Even if the joint capacity
region is zero, the individual criterion can provide an non
vanishing achievable rate. This increase in the rate comes
from the usage of secret key encoding in addition to the
standard random wiretap encoding. That is why the value
of this increase is directly proportional with the size of the
individual messages cf. (30) and (31).
3. The joint secrecy criterion is a very conservative secrecy
measure. Even if one of the confidential messages is revealed
to the eavesdropper in a genie-aided way, the other message
is still protected as follows:
I(M1; ZnM2) = I(M1; M2) + I(M1; Zn|M2)
(a)
= I(M1; Zn|M2) ≤ τn, (34)
where (a) follows because M1 and M2 are independent.
The previous equation shows that the leakage of M1 to the
eavesdropper when M2 is revealed to it is still small.
4. On the other hand, the individual secrecy criterion is
based on the mutual trust between the legitimate receivers.
Thus if one of the messages is compromised, this might also
affects the secrecy of the other one. In order to understand
this property, imagine that in the previous two examples, M2
was revealed to the eavesdropper as follows:
I(M1; ZnM2) = H(M1)−H(M1|ZnM2). (35)
In the first scenario, where the eavesdropper Z is less noisy
than the two legitimate receivers, the term H(M1|ZnM2) will
vanish. This is because the eavesdropper can correctly decode
M⊗, then using the secret key M2, it can extract M1 as well.
This implies that M1 is fully leaked to the eavesdropper when
M2 is revealed to it. However, in the second scenario, the
situation is a little bit different. This is because the term
H(M1|ZnM2) does not vanish, yet it is smaller than H(M1).
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This means that a part of M1 is leaked to the eavesdropper up
on revealing M2. The size of this part depends on how much
the eavesdropper can infer using its received signal Zn and
M2.
5. The preference in choosing among the two secrecy
criteria is a trade of between conservative secrecy measure
and a larger capacity region and the decision should always
be based on whether the legitimate receivers can trust one
another or not.
IV. THE JOINT SECRECY CAPACITY REGION
In this section, we investigate the joint secrecy criterion for
the general model of the wiretap BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition given by Figure 2.
A. Achievable Rate Region
Proposition 1. An achievable joint secrecy rate region for the
wiretap BC with degraded message sets and message cognition
is given by the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈
R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U)− I(V0V1; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U)− I(V0V2; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− I(V0V1; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− I(V0V2; Z|U)
2R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U) + I(V0V2; Y2|U)
−I(V1; V2|V0)−I(V0V1V2; Z|U)− I(V0; Z|U)
Rc + 2R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1) + I(V0V2; Y2|U)
−I(V1; V2|V0)−I(V0V1V2; Z|U)− I(V0; Z|U)
Rc + 2R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U) + I(V0V2; Y2)
−I(V1; V2|V0)−I(V0V1V2; Z|U)− I(V0; Z|U)
(36)
for random variables with joint probability distribution Q(u)
Q(v0|u) Q(v1, v2|v0) Q(x|v1, v2) Q(y1, y2, z|x), such that
U−V0 − (V1,V2)−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
Proof: The proof combines the principle of superposition
random coding [15] in addition to the usage of Marton coding
for secrecy as in [20], where strong secrecy is achieved as in
[34–36].
1. Message sets: We consider the following sets: The set
of common messages Mc = J1, 2nRcK, the set of confidential
common messages M0 = J1, 2nR0K, two sets of confidential
individual messages M1 = J1, 2nR1K and M2 = J1, 2nR2K,
three sets of randomization messages for secrecy Mr =J1, 2nRrK, Mr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K, finally
two additional sets Mt1 = J1, 2nRt1 K and Mt2 = J1, 2nRt2 K
needed for the construction of Marton coding. Additionally
we use M = M0 ×M1 ×M2 to abbreviate the set of all
confidential messages.
2. Random Codebook Csn: Fix an input distribution
Q(u, v0, v1, v2, x). Construct the codewords un(mc) for
mc ∈ Mc by generating symbols ui(mc) with i ∈ J1, nK
independently according to Q(u). For every un(mc), generate
codewords vn0 (mc,m,mr) for m ∈ M and mr ∈ Mr by
generating symbols v0i(mc,m,mr) independently at random
according to Q(v0|ui(mc)). Next, for each vn0 (mc,m,mr)
generate the codewords vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mt1) and
vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt2) for mr1 ∈ Mr1 , mr2 ∈ Mr2 ,
mt1 ∈ Mt1 and mt2 ∈ Mt2 by generating symbols
v1i(mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mt1) and v2i(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt2)
independently at random according to Q(v1|v0i(mc,m,mr))
and Q(v2|v0i(mc,m,mr)) respectively.
3. Encoder E: Given a message pair (mc,m), where
m = (m0,m1,m2), the transmitter chooses three random-
ization messages mr, mr1 and mr2 uniformly at random
from the sets Mr, Mr1 and Mr2 respectively. Then, it
finds a pair (mt1 ,mt2) such that v
n
1 (mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mt1)
and vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt2) are jointly typical. Finally, it
generates a codeword xn independently at random according
to
∏n
i=1Q(xi|v1i , v2i) and transmits it.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given yn1 and its
own message m2, outputs (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1, mˆr); if they are
the unique messages, such that un(mˆc), vn0 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr),
vn1 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr, mˆr1 , mˆt1) and y
n
1 are jointly typical, for
some (mˆr1 , mˆt1) ∈ Mr1 ×Mt1 , where mˆ = (mˆ0, mˆ1,m2).
Otherwise declares an error.
5. Second Legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given yn2 and its
own message m1, outputs (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2, m˜r); if they are
the unique messages, such that un(m˜c), vn0 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r),
vn2 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r, m˜r2 , m˜t2) and y
n
2 are jointly typical, for some
(m˜r2 , m˜t2) ∈ Mr2 × Mt2 , where m˜ = (m˜0,m1, m˜2).
Otherwise declares an error.
6. Third Eavesdropper Decoder ϕ3: Given zn, outputs
mˇc; if it is the unique message, such that un(mˇc) and zn
are jointly typical. Otherwise declares an error.
7. Reliability Analysis: We define the average error prob-
ability of this scheme as
Pˆe(Cn) , P
[
(Mˆc, Mˆ0, Mˆ1, Mˆr) 6= (Mc,M0,M1,Mr) or
(M˜c, M˜0, M˜2, M˜r) 6= (Mc,M0,M2,Mr) or Mˇc 6= Mc
]
.
We then observe that Pˆe(Cn) ≥ Pe(Cn), cf. (3). Using the
standard analysis of random coding we can prove that for a
sufficiently large n, with high probability Pˆe(Cn) ≤ n if
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)− δn(n)
Rt1+Rt2 ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δn(n)
R0+R1+Rr+Rr1+Rt1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|U)− δn(n)
R0+R2+Rr+Rr2+Rt2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|U)− δn(n)
Rc+R0+R1+Rr+Rr1+Rt1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1)− δn(n)
Rc+R0+R2+Rr+Rr2+Rt2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2)− δn(n). (37)
The validity of (37) follows from the product structure of
the codebook, the full cognition of the individual messages at
the legitimate receivers and the principle of indirect decoding
used in [20]. In addition, the second constraint follows due
to Marton coding technique, where the summation of Rt1
10 SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION
and Rt2 should be greater than I(V1; V2|V0) to guarantee the
existence of a typical pair (vn1 , v
n
2 ).
8. Secrecy Analysis: Our secrecy analysis is based on
different strong secrecy techniques as in [34–36]. We start
by identifying all the virtual channels that exist between the
confidential messages and the eavesdropper. Based on the
codebook structure, we can define four possible channels
as follow: Q1 : V0 → P(Z), Q2 : V0 × V1 → P(Z),
Q3 : V0 × V2 → P(Z) and Q4 : V0 × V1 × V2 → P(Z).
According to [35], in order to fulfill the joint strong secrecy
criterion in (18), we need to make sure that the randomization
rate in the input sequence to each of these virtual channels
is at least equivalent to the mutual information between the
channel input and the eavesdropper. Thus, for a sufficiently
large n and τn > 0, the joint secrecy constraints given in (18)
is with high probability smaller than τn, if
Rr ≥ I(V0; Z|U) + δn(τn)
Rr +Rr1 +Rt1 ≥ I(V0V1; Z|U) + δn(τn)
Rr +Rr2 +Rt2 ≥ I(V0V2; Z|U) + δn(τn)
Rr +Rr1 +Rr2 ≥ I(V0V1V2; Z|U) + δn(τn). (38)
If we combine Eq. (37) and Eq. (38) then apply the Fourier-
Motzkin elimination procedure, followed by taking the limit
as n → ∞, which implies that δn(n) and δn(τn) → 0, we
prove the achievability of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2)
satisfying (36).
B. Secrecy Capacity For A Class of More Capable Channels
Theorem 5. Consider a wiretap BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition, where one of the legitimate
receivers Y1 is more capable than the eavesdropper Z, while
the relation between the other legitimate receiver Y2 and
the eavesdropper Z is arbitrary. Then, the joint secrecy
capacity region is given by the set of all rate quadruples
(Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2|U)− I(V; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z|U)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V; Y2)− I(V; Z|U) (39)
for some (U,V,X), such that U−V −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 3 and
|V| ≤ |X |2 + 4|X |+ 3.
Proof: The achievability is based on the principle of
indirect decoding introduced in [6] and its extension to secrecy
scenarios discussed in [20]. It also follows directly from
Proposition 1, by letting V2 = ∅, V0 = V and V1 = X in (36).
This implies that the first legitimate receiver Y1 which is more
capable than the eavesdropper Z finds its intended messages by
direct decoding from X, while the second legitimate receiver
Y2 which has no stastical advantage over the eavesdropper
Z finds its intended messages by indirect decoding from the
auxiliary random variable V.
For the converse, we start by modifying the joint secrecy
constraint in (18) to include the conditioning on the common
message. For this we need the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Consider two independent random variables M
and W, such that H(W|Zn) ≤ α and I(M; Zn) ≤ β, where
α, β > 0. Then, I(M; Zn|W) ≤ α+ β holds.
Proof: The proof is based on the properties of the entropy
function and is given in Appendix B for completeness.
Since Eq. (6) implies that H(Mc|Zn) ≤ nγc(n) and Eq.
(18) implies that I(M0M1M2; Zn) ≤ τn, we can use the
previous lemma to reformulate the joint secrecy constraint for
our scenario as:
I(M0M1M2; Zn|Mc) ≤ nγc(n) + τn. (40)
Now, we are ready to formulate our converse. First, we
let Ui , (Mc, Z˜i+1), K1i , Yi−11 , K2i , Yi−12 , M ,
(M0,M1,M2), V1i , (M,Ui,K1i ) and V2i , (M,Ui,K2i ). We
then start by considering the common rate Rc, applying the
same steps used in (9), we have
Rc ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Zi) + γc(n). (41)
Next, we consider the confidential rates (R0 + R1) intended
for the first legitimate receiver. We have
R0 +R1
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(M0M1; Yn1 |M2Mc) + γ1(n)
≤ 1
n
I(M; Yn1 |Mc) + γ1(n)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 )− I(M; Zi|McZ˜i+1)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
(c)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Y1i|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)
− I(M; Zi|McYi−11 Z˜i+1)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ γ1(n, τn), (42)
where (a) follows from (7); (b) follows from (40), where
γ1(n, τn) = τn/n + γc(n) + γ1(n) and (c) follows by
the Csisza´r sum identity [15, Lemma 7]. Following the same
steps we can derive a similar bound for the confidential rates
(R0 +R2) intended for the second legitimate receiver as:
R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|UiK2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
]
+ γ2(n, τn), (43)
where γ2(n, τn) = τn/n+γc(n)+γ2(n). On the other hand,
if we consider the sum of the common rate and the confidential
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rates (Rc+R0+R1) intended for the first legitimate receiver,
we have
Rc+R0 +R1
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(McM0M1; Yn1 |M2) + γ˜1(n)
≤ 1
n
I(McM; Yn1 ) + γ˜1(n)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(Mc; Yn1 ) + I(M; Y
n
1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ γ˜1(n, τn)
(c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(McZ˜i+1; Y1i|Yi−11 ) + I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )
− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ γ˜1(n, τn)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Ui; Y1i|K1i ) + I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )
− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ γ˜1(n, τn)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|K1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ γ˜1(n, τn), (44)
where (a) follows from (6) and (7) as γ˜1(n) = γc(n) +
γ1(n); (b) follows from (40), where γ˜1(n, τn) = τn/n +
2γc(n) + γ1(n); (c) follows as in (42) and the fact that
I(McZ˜i+1; Y1i|Yi−11 ) ≥ I(Mc; Y1i|Yi−11 ); while (d) follows
from the chain rule of mutual information. Following the same
steps we can derive a similar bound for the sum of the common
rate and the confidential rates (Rc + R0 + R2) intended for
the second legitimate receiver as
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|K2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
]
+ γ˜2(n, τn), (45)
where γ˜2(n, τn) = τn/n+ 2γc(n) +γ2(n). Now using (41)
- (45) followed by introducing a random variable T indepen-
dent of all others and uniformly distributed over J1;nK and
let U = (UT,T), K1 = K1T, K
2 = K2T, V
1 = V1T, V
2 = V2T,
Y1 = Y1T, Y2 = Y2T and Z = ZT, then take the limit as
n → ∞ such that γc(n), γ1(n, τn), γ˜1(n, τn), γ2(n, τn)
and γ˜2(n, τn)→ 0, we reach the following
Rc ≤ I(U; Z) (46a)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|UK1)− I(V1; Z|UK1) (46b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|UK2)− I(V2; Z|UK2) (46c)
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|K1)− I(V1; Z|UK1) (46d)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|K2)− I(V2; Z|UK2), (46e)
where (U,K1)−V1 −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) and (U,K2)−V2−
X− (Y1,Y2,Z) form Markov chains. First, let us consider
(46c) and (46e), these two inequalities identify the constraints
on the common and confidential rates with respect to the
second legitimate receiver, which have an arbitrary relation
with the eavesdropper. Since conditional mutual information
is the expectation of the unconditional one, Eq. (46c) can be
upper bounded as follows:
R0 +R2 ≤ EK2
[
I(V2; Y2|U,K2)−I(V2; Z|U,K2)
]
(a)
≤ I(V2; Y2|U,K2 =k2∗)− I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2∗)
(b)
= I(V2∗; Y2|U)− I(V2∗; Z|U), (47)
where U−V2∗ −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain.
(a) follows because k2∗ is the value of K2 such that,
I(V2; Y2|U,K2 =k2∗)− I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2∗) is greater than
or equal I(V2; Y2|U,K2 =k2) − I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2), for all
k2 ∈ K2; while (b) follows as V2∗ is distributed as
Q(v2|u, k2 = k2∗). Similarly we can bound Eq. (46e) as
follows:
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ EK2
[
I(V2; Y2|K2)−I(V2; Z|U,K2)
]
(a)
≤ I(V2; Y2|K2 =k2?)−I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2?)
(b)
= I(V2?; Y2)− I(V2?; Z|U)
(c)
= I(U; Y2) + I(V2?; Y2|U)− I(V2?; Z|U)
(d)
≤ I(U; Y2) + I(V2∗; Y2|U)− I(V2∗; Z|U)
= I(V2∗; Y2)− I(V2∗; Z|U), (48)
where (a) follows as k2? is the value of K2 such that,
I(V2; Y2|K2 =k2?)− I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2?) is greater than or
equal to I(V2; Y2|K2 =k2)−I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2), for all k2 ∈
K2; (b) follows as V2? is distributed as Q(v2|u, k2 = k2?);
(c) follows because U−V2? −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain; and (d) follows because the term
I(V2?; Y2|U)− I(V2?; Z|U) can be reformulated as
I(V2; Y2|U,K2 =k2?) − I(V2; Z|U,K2 =k2?) which is
smaller than or equal to I(V2∗; Y2|U)− I(V2∗; Z|U). This
actually implies that k2∗ and k2? are identical and the
differences of the mutual information condition on K2 in
(46c) and (46e) are maximized by the same value.
Now, consider (46b) and (46d), these two inequalities
identify the constraints on the common and confidential rates
with respect to the first legitimate receiver which is more
capable than the eavesdropper. In order to simplify these two
inequalities we require the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let Q(y, z|x) be a discrete memoryless BC
and assume that Y is more capable than Z. Consider K,
U1, U2 and V to be a set of random variables, such
that (U1,U2,K)−V −X− (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain.
Then the following holds: I(V; Y|U1K)− I(V; Z|U2K) ≤
I(X; Y|U1)− I(X; Z|U2).
Proof: This lemma is based on the properties of more
capable channels and the definition of the conditional mutual
information. A detailed proof is given in Appendix C for
completeness.
If we apply the previous lemma to Eq. (46b) by letting
U1 = U2 = U, we have
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U). (49)
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On the other hand if we let U1 = ∅ and U2 = U, then applied
the previous lemma to Eq. (46d), we reach the following bound
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z|U). (50)
Now, if we combine the upper bounds in (46a), (47) - (50),
then let V = V2∗, such that U−V −X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain, we reach a region that matches the achievable
rate region given by (39) and this completes our converse. One
last point remains, regarding the cardinality bounds on |U| and
|V|, they follow from the Fenchel-Bunt strengthening of the
usual Carathe´odory’s theorem [31, Appendix C].
Corollary 1. Consider a wiretap BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition where the two legitimate receivers
Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than the eavesdropper Z, i.e. Y1  Z
and Y2  Z. Then, the joint secrecy capacity region is given
by the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that
satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U)
for some (U,X), such that U−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a
Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X|+ 3.
Proof: The achievability of the previous region follows as
in Theorem 5 by substituting V = X, while the converse can
be derived using the standard techniques of less noisy channels
as in [20]. The previous region was first established in [2].
Corollary 2. Consider a wiretap BC with message cognition
only where the two legitimate receivers Y1 and Y2 are more
capable than the eavesdropper Z. Then, the joint secrecy
capacity region is given by the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈
R2+ that satisfy
R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z)
R2 ≤ I(X; Y2)− I(X; Z)
Proof: The achievability of the previous region follows
as in Theorem 5 by substituting V = X and U = ∅, while the
converse follows by adapting the more capable condition to
the second legitimate receiver Y2. The previous region was
first established in [1].
V. THE INDIVIDUAL SECRECY CAPACITY REGION
In this section, we investigate the model of the wiretap BC
with degraded message sets and message cognition given by
Figure 2 under the individual secrecy constraint.
A. Achievable Rate Region
Proposition 2. An achievable individual secrecy rate region
for the wiretap BC with degraded message sets and mes-
sage cognition is given by the set of all rate quadruples
(Rc, R0, R1 = R11+R12, R2 = R21+R22) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Z), I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2)
]
R12 = R21 ≤ min
[
R1, R2, I(V⊗; Y1|U), I(V⊗; Y2|U)
]
R0+R11 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗)− I(V0V1; Z|V⊗)
R0+R22 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗)− I(V0V2; Z|V⊗)
2R0+R11+R22 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗) + I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗)
−I(V1; V2|V0)−I(V0V1V2; Z|V⊗)− I(V0; Z|V⊗) (51)
for random variables with joint probability distribution Q(u)
Q(v⊗|u) Q(v0|v⊗) Q(v1, v2|v0) Q(x|v1, v2) Q(y1, y2, z|x),
such that U−V⊗ −V0 − (V1,V2)−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms
a Markov chain.
Proof: The proof combines the principle of superposition
random coding [15], one time pad for Shannon’s cipher system
[13], the usage of Marton coding for secrecy as in [20], where
strong secrecy is achieved as in [34–36].
1. Message sets: We consider the following sets: The set of
common messages Mc = J1, 2nRcK, the set of confidential
common messages M0 = J1, 2nR0K, two sets of confidential
individual messages M1 = J1, 2nR1K and M2 = J1, 2nR2K,
three sets of randomization messages for secrecy Mr =J1, 2nRrK, Mr1 = J1, 2nRr1 K and Mr2 = J1, 2nRr2 K, finally
two additional sets Mt1 = J1, 2nRt1 K and Mt2 = J1, 2nRt2 K
needed for the construction of Marton coding. Further we
divided each confidential individual messages set into two sets
as follows:M1 =M11×M12 andM2 =M21×M22, where
M11 = J1, 2nR11K, M12 = J1, 2nR12K, M21 = J1, 2nR21K
and M22 = J1, 2nR22K. In this division, we force M12
and M21 to be of the same size and use them to construct
M⊗ = J1, 2nR⊗K by Xoring the corresponding elements of
both. Additionally we use M = M0 ×M11 ×M22 ×M⊗
to abbreviate the modified set of all confidential messages.
It is important to note that the message structure forces the
following condition:
R⊗ = R12 = R21 ≤ min
[
R1, R2
]
(52)
2. Random Codebook Csn: Fix an input distribution
Q(u, v⊗, v0, v1, v2, x). Construct the codewords un(mc) for
mc ∈ Mc by generating symbols ui(mc) with i ∈ J1, nK
independently according to Q(u). For every un(mc), generate
codewords vn⊗(mc,m⊗) for m⊗ ∈ M⊗ by generating
symbols v⊗i(mc,m⊗) independently at random according
to Q(v⊗|ui(mc)). Next, for every vn⊗(mc,m⊗) generate
codewords vn0 (mc,m,mr) for m ∈ M and mr ∈ Mr by
generating symbols v0i(mc,m,mr) independently at random
according to Q(v0|v⊗i(mc,m⊗)). For each vn0 (mc,m,mr)
generate the codewords vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mt1) and
vn2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt2) for mr1 ∈ Mr1 , mr2 ∈ Mr2 ,
mt1 ∈ Mt1 and mt2 ∈ Mt2 by generating symbols
v1i(mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mt1) and v2i(mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt2)
independently at random according to Q(v1|v0i(mc,m,mr))
and Q(v2|v0i(mc,m,mr)) respectively.
3. Encoder E: Given a message pair (mc,m), where
m = (m0,m11,m22,m⊗) and m⊗ = m12 ⊗ m21, the
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transmitter chooses three randomization messages mr, mr1
and mr2 uniformly at random from the sets Mr, Mr1 and
Mr2 respectively. Then, it finds a pair (mt1 ,mt2) such that
vn1 (mc,m,mr,mr1 ,mt1) and v
n
2 (mc,m,mr,mr2 ,mt2) are
jointly typical. Finally, it generates a codeword xn inde-
pendently at random according to
∏n
i=1Q(xi|v1i , v2i) and
transmits it.
4. First Legitimate Decoder ϕ1: Given yn1 and its own
message m2 = (m21,m22), outputs (mˆc, mˆ0, mˆ1, mˆr); where
mˆ1 is the concatenation of mˆ11 and mˆ12. First it finds
the unique messages (mˆc, mˆ⊗, mˆ, mˆr) such that un(mˆc),
vn⊗(mˆc, mˆ⊗), v
n
0 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr), v
n
1 (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr, mˆr1 , mˆt1) and
yn1 are jointly typical, for some (mˆr1 , mˆt1) ∈ Mr1 ×Mt1 ,
where mˆ = (mˆ0, mˆ11,m22, mˆ⊗). Then, it computes mˆ12 by
Xoring m21 and mˆ⊗. Otherwise it declares an error.
5. Second legitimate Decoder ϕ2: Given yn2 and its own
message m1 = (m11,m12), outputs (m˜c, m˜0, m˜2, m˜r); where
m˜2 is the concatenation of m˜21 and m˜22. First it finds
the unique messages (m˜c, m˜⊗, m˜, m˜r) such that un(m˜c),
vn⊗(m˜c, m˜⊗), v
n
0 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r), v
n
2 (m˜c, m˜, m˜r, m˜r2 , m˜t2) and
yn2 are jointly typical, for some (m˜r2 , m˜t2) ∈ Mr2 ×Mt2 ,
where m˜ = (m˜0,m11, m˜22, m˜⊗). Then, it computes m˜21 by
Xoring m12 and m˜⊗. Otherwise it declares an error.
6. Third Eavesdropper Decoder ϕ3: Given zn, outputs
mˇc; if it is the unique message, such that un(mˇc) and zn
are jointly typical. Otherwise it declares an error.
7. Reliability Analysis: We define the error probability of
this scheme as
P¨e(Cn) , P
[
(Mˆc, Mˆ⊗, Mˆ0, Mˆ11, Mˆr) 6= (Mc,M⊗,M0,M11,
Mr) or (M˜c, M˜⊗, M˜0, M˜22, M˜r) 6= (Mc,M⊗,
M0,M22,Mr) or Mˇc 6= Mc
]
.
We then observe that P¨e(Cn) ≥ Pe(Cn), cf. (3). Using the
standard analysis of random coding we can prove that for a
sufficiently large n, with high probability P¨e(Cn) ≤ n if
Rc ≤ min
[
I(U; Y1), I(U; Y2), I(U; Z)
]
− δn(n)
R⊗ ≤ min
[
I(V⊗; Y1|U), I(V⊗; Y2|U)
]
− δn(n)
Rt1 +Rt2 ≥ I(V1; V2|V0) + δn(n)
R0 +R11 +Rr +Rr1 +Rt1 ≤ I(V0V1; Y1|V⊗)− δn(n)
R0 +R22 +Rr +Rr2 +Rt2 ≤ I(V0V2; Y2|V⊗)− δn(n).
(53)
8. Secrecy Analysis: Because of the new message sets
structure, the random variable M1 is identified as the product
of two independent and uniformly distributed random variables
M11 and M12. This also applies to M2 which is the product of
two independent and uniformly distributed random variables
M21 and M22. Thus, the individual secrecy constraint given
by (19) becomes
I(M0M11; Zn) + I(M12; Zn|M0M11) ≤ τ1n
I(M0M22; Zn) + I(M21; Zn|M0M22) ≤ τ2n. (54)
The term I(M12; Zn|M0M11) represents the leakage of M12
to the eavesdropper given M0 and M11. One can proof that
this term vanishes as
I(M12; Zn|M0M11) = H(M12|M0M11)−H(M12|ZnM0M11)
(a)
= H(M12)−H(M12|ZnM0M11)
(b)
≤ H(M12)−H(M12|M⊗) (c)= 0, (55)
where (a) follows because M12, M0 and M11 are independent;
(b) follows because the best the eavesdropper can do is to
decode M⊗; while (c) follows because of the principle of
one time pad in Shannon’s cipher system where the entropy
of the secret key H(M21) is equal to the entropy of the
transmitted message H(M12). Using the same steps, we can
prove that the term I(M21; Zn|M0M22) which represents the
leakage of M21 to the eavesdropper given M0 and M22 also
vanishes. On the other hand, for a sufficiently large n and
τn ≥ max(τ1n, τ2n) > 0, the terms I(M0M11; Zn) and
I(M0M22; Zn) are with high probability smaller than τn, if
Rr ≥ I(V0; Z|V⊗) + δn(τn)
Rr +Rr1 +Rt1 ≥ I(V0V1; Z|V⊗) + δn(τn)
Rr +Rr2 +Rt2 ≥ I(V0V2; Z|V⊗) + δn(τn)
Rr +Rr1 +Rr2 ≥ I(V0V1V2; Z|V⊗) + δn(τn). (56)
This follows from applying the strong secrecy approach in
[35] to the codebook structure of the individual secrecy as we
did for the joint secrecy in the previous section. This implies
that under the previous constraints, the leakage terms in (54)
are with high probability smaller than τn.
Now, if we combine (52), (53) and (56), then take the limit
as n → ∞, which implies that δn(n) and δn(τn) → 0, we
prove the achievability of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2)
satisfying (51).
B. Secrecy Capacity For A Class of More Capable Channels
Theorem 6. Consider a wiretap BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition, where the two legitimate receivers
Y1 and Y2 are more capable than the eavesdropper Z. Then,
the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the set of
all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+ that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) +R⊗
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U) +R⊗
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z|U) +R⊗
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2)− I(X; Z|U) +R⊗ (57)
where R⊗ = min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
, for some (U,X), such
that U−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a Markov chain. Further it
suffices to have |U| ≤ |X |+ 2.
Proof: The achievability is based on the same principle
used in Proposition 2. We start by modifying the structure
of the random codebook as follows: For every un(mc), we
generate the codewords xn(mc,m,mr) by generating sym-
bols xi(mc,m,mr) independently at random according to
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Q(x|ui(mc)). Given a message pair (mc,m), the encoder
chooses a message mr uniformly at random from the set Mr
and transmits xn(mc,m,mr). This changes the decoder at
the first legitimate receiver such that, it outputs (mˆc, mˆ, mˆr),
if it is the unique triple, where un(mˆc), xn(mˆc, mˆ, mˆr) and
yn1 are jointly typical. The decoder at the second legitimate
receiver also changes in the same way, while the decoder as the
eavesdropper is kept unchanged. Under these modifications,
the reliability conditions in (53) changes to:
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)− δn(n)
R0 +R11 +R⊗ +Rr ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− δn(n)
R0 +R22 +R⊗ +Rr ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− δn(n)
Rc +R0 +R11 +R⊗ +Rr ≤ I(X; Y1)− δn(n)
Rc +R0 +R22 +R⊗ +Rr ≤ I(X; Y2)− δn(n). (58)
On the other hand, the secrecy conditions in (56) simplifies to
R⊗ +Rr ≥ I(X; Z|U) + δn(τn). (59)
Now using Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the rate constraints
given in (52), (58) and (59) followed by taking the limit as
n→∞, which implies that δn(n) and δn(τn)→ 0, leads the
achievability of any rate quadruple (Rc, R0, R1, R2) satisfying
(57).
Before jumping to the converse, it is important to highlight
the difference between the coding structure in Proposition 2
and in this theorem. In this theorem, the two secrecy encoding
techniques: one time pad secret key encoding and wiretap
random coding were combined in the same layer X. On the
other hand, in Proposition 2 they were structured into two
different layers. In the first layer V⊗ was used for the one
time pad secret key encoding, while the wiretap random coding
was performed in the next layers using V0, V1 and V2. This
is because combining the two techniques in the same layer is
only possible, if the two legitimate receivers have a statistical
advantage over the eavesdropper, such that I(X; Y1) and
I(X; Y2) are greater than I(X; Z). Otherwise, the conditions
in (58) and (59) can not be fulfilled simultaneously leading to
a decoding failure.
Now for the converse, we start by letting Ui , (Mc, Z˜i+1),
K1i , Yi−11 , K2i , Yi−12 , M , (M0,M1,M2), V1i ,
(M,Ui,K
1
i ) and V
2
i , (M,Ui,K2i ). Using the same steps
carried out in (9), we have
Rc ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Zi) + γc(n). (60)
Next, let us consider the confidential rates (R0+R1) intended
to the first legitimate receiver, we have
R0 +R1
(a)
≤ 1
n
I(M0M1; Yn1 |M2Mc) + γ1(n)
≤ 1
n
I(M; Yn1 |Mc) + γ1(n)
(b)
≤ 1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc)−max
[
I(M0M1; Zn|Mc),
I(M0M2; Zn|Mc)
]]
+ γ1(n, τn)
=
1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
+
1
n
min
[
I(M1; Zn|M0M2Mc), I(M2; Zn|M0M1Mc)
]
(c)
≤ 1
n
[
I(M; Yn1 |Mc)− I(M; Zn|Mc)
]
+ min
[
R1, R2
]
+ γ1(n, τn)
(d)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|UiK1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ min
[
R1, R2
]
+ γ1(n, τn), (61)
where (a) follows from (7); (b) follows after modifying the
individual secrecy conditions in (19) to include the condition-
ing on the common message Mc based on (6) and Lemma 2;
(c) follows because of the fact that R1 ≥ I(M1; Zn|M0M2Mc)
and R2 ≥ I(M2; Zn|M0M1Mc); and (d) follows as in (42).
Following the same steps we can derive a similar bound for the
confidential rates (R0 +R2) intended to the second legitimate
receiver as:
R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|UiK2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
]
+ min
[
R1, R2
]
+ γ2(n, τn). (62)
Now, consider the sum of the common rate and the confidential
rates to the first and the second legitimate receivers. Using the
techniques used in (61) and (44), we can derive the following
bounds
Rc +R0 +R1 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1i ; Y1i|K1i )− I(V1i ; Zi|UiK1i )
]
+ min
[
R1, R2
]
+ γ˜1(n, τn)
Rc +R0 +R2 ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(V2i ; Y2i|K2i )− I(V2i ; Zi|UiK2i )
]
+ min
[
R1, R2
]
+ γ˜2(n, τn). (63)
Now using (60), (61), (62) and (63), followed by introducing
a random variable T independent of all others and uni-
formly distributed over J1;nK and let U = (UT,T), K1 = K1T,
K2 = K2T, V
1 = V1T, V
2 = V2T, Y1 = Y1T, Y2 = Y2T and
Z = ZT, then take the limit as n → ∞ such that γc(n),
γ1(n, τn), γ˜1(n, τn), γ2(n, τn) and γ˜2(n, τn) → 0, we
reach the following
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0+R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|UK1)−I(V1; Z|UK1)+min
[
R1, R2
]
R0+R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|UK2)−I(V2; Z|UK2)+min
[
R1, R2
]
Rc+R0+R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|K1)−I(V1; Z|UK1)+min
[
R1, R2
]
Rc+R0+R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|K2)−I(V2; Z|UK2)+min
[
R1, R2
]
.
Since Y1 and Y2 are more capable than Z, we can use
Lemma 3 to modify the previous bounds as we did in
modifying the bounds in (46b) and (46d) to (49) and (50)
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as follows:
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2
]
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2
]
Rc+R0+R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2
]
Rc+R0+R2 ≤ I(X; Y2)− I(X; Z|U) + min
[
R1, R2
]
. (64)
To finalize our converse, we need to highlight the upper bounds
required for reliable communication established in (14) and
(15) in addition to the standard upper bound in (16). These
bounds will impose and additional constraint to guarantee
that the addition of the minimum of R1 and R2 does not
contradict them. Thus the term min[R1, R2] will change to
min[R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)]. Introducing this modification to the
bounds in (64) matches the rate region in (57) and this
completes our converse.
Corollary 3. Consider a wiretap BC with degraded message
sets and message cognition where the two legitimate receivers
Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than the eavesdropper Z, i.e. Y1  Z
and Y2  Z. Then, the individual secrecy capacity region is
given by the set of all rate quadruples (Rc, R0, R1, R2) ∈ R4+
that satisfy
Rc ≤ I(U; Z)
R0+R1 ≤ I(X; Y1|U)−I(X; Z|U)+min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
R0+R2 ≤ I(X; Y2|U)−I(X; Z|U)+min
[
R1, R2, I(X; Z|U)
]
for some (U,X), such that U−X− (Y1,Y2,Z) forms a
Markov chain. Further it suffices to have |U| ≤ |X|+ 3.
Proof: The previous region is a special case from the
region in Theorem 2, where the sum rate bound is not needed
because of the properties of less noisy channels. The previous
region was first established in [2].
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied a three-receiver broadcast channel with degraded
message sets and message cognition. We established the non-
secrecy capacity region for the general case by providing a
weak converse showing that the straightforward extension of
the Ko¨rner and Marton bound to our model is optimal. We
then investigated, evaluated and compared the performance
of two different secrecy constraints for our model: the joint
secrecy and the individual one. For each constraint we derived
a general achievable rate region. We further showed that the
principle of indirect decoding is optimal for the joint secrecy
criterion, if only one of the legitimate receivers is more capable
than the eavesdropper, such that it establishes the capacity.
On the other hand, we managed to establish the individual
secrecy capacity if the two receivers are more capable than the
eavesdropper. Our results indicate that the individual secrecy
provides a larger capacity region as compared to the joint
one. This increase arises from the mutual trust between the
legitimate receivers in the individual secrecy constraint that
allows the usage of secret key encoding, which is not possible
for the conservative joint secrecy.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We define ∆ = 1n [I(M; Z
n|W) − I(M; Yn|W)]
and prove that if Y  Z, ∆ ≤ 0 and this directly implies our
proposition. Let Ui , (W, Z˜i+1,Yi−1) and Vi , (M,Ui),
we have
∆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Zi|WZ˜i+1)− I(M; Yi|WYi−1)
]
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(M; Zi|WZ˜i+1Yi−1)− I(M; Yi|WZ˜i+1Yi−1)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vi; Zi|Ui)− I(Vi; Yi|Ui)
]
(b)
= I(V; Z|U)− I(V; Y|U)
= EU
[
I(V; Z|U)− I(V; Y|U)
]
(c)
≤ I(V; Z|U = u∗)− I(V; Y|U = u∗)
(d)
≤ I(V∗; Z)− I(V∗; Y)
(e)
≤ 0 (65)
where (a) follows from the Csisza´r sum identity [15, Lemma
7]; (b) follows by introducing a random variable T indepen-
dent of all others and uniformly distributed over J1, nK, then
letting U = (UT ,T), V = VT , Y = YT and Z = ZT ; (c)
follows as u∗ is the value of U that maximizes the difference;
(d) follows as V∗ is distributed as Q(v|u = u∗) cf. [11,
Corollary 2.3] and (e) follows since V∗ −X− (Y,Z) forms
a Markov chain and Y  Z.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: We have
I(M; Zn|W) = H(M|W)−H(M|ZnW)
≤ H(M|W)−H(M|ZnW)−H(W|Zn) + α
(a)
= H(M)−H(WM|Zn) + α
= H(M)−H(M|Zn)−H(W|ZnM) + α
(b)
≤ I(M; Zn) + α ≤ α+ β,
where (a) follows because M and W are independent, while
(b) follows because H(W|ZnM) ≥ 0.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Let Θ , I(V; Y|U1K)− I(V; Z|U2K), we have
Θ = EK
[
I(V; Y|U1,K)− I(V; Z|U2,K)
]
(a)
≤ I(V; Y|U1,K =k∗)− I(V; Z|U2,K =k∗)
(b)
= I(V∗; Y|U1)− I(V∗; Z|U2)
(c)
= I(X; Y|U1)− I(X; Y|V∗)− I(X; Z|U2) + I(X; Z|V∗)
(d)
≤ I(X; Y|U1)− I(X; Z|U2),
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where (a) follows as k∗ is the value of K that maximizes the
difference; (b) follows as V∗ is distributed as Q(v|u1, u2, k =
k∗); (c) follows since (U1,U2)−V∗ −X− (Y,Z) forms a
Markov chain and (d) follows because Y is more capable
than Z, which implies that I(X; Y|V∗) ≥ I(X; Z|V∗).
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